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REMOVAL DOCTRINE REAFFIRMED: FRANCHISE TAX
BOARD V CONSTRUCTION LABORERS VACATION
TRUST
INTRODUCTION
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, I the
Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed the well-pleaded complaint
rule, which provides that a federal question must appear on the face
of a properly pleaded complaint in order for the case to be cogniza-
ble in a federal court.2 The Court also established a rule for deter-
mining the removability of actions brought in state courts for
declaratory judgments, holding such actions removable only if the
anticipated coercive action would raise a federal question.3
Directly addressing the well-pleaded complaint rule for the first
time in nine years,4 the Court clarified the rule, and discussed
grounds for an exceptioli to it based on federal preemption. 5 By
rejecting possible broader approaches to jurisdiction in Franchise Tax
Board, the Court clearly indicated its intent to interpret the well-
pleaded complaint rule and federal jurisdiction as narrowly as
possible. 6
This Note surveys the provisions of the well-pleaded complaint
rule in the removal context and the requirements for original fed-
eral jurisdiction over federal declaratory judgment actions and re-
moval jurisdiction over state declaratory judgment actions. The
Note then examines how the Franchise Tax Board Court applied the
law in these areas. The Note concludes that while the Court's appli-
cation of the well-pleaded complaint rule represents the proper ap-
1 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983).
2 See infra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
3 The Court applied the rule for federal declaratory judgments articulated in
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), see infra notes 39-50 and
accompanying text, to actions for declaratory judgments brought in state court.
Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2851. See infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
4 The Court last addressed the well-pleaded complaint rule in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974), where it reaffirmed the rule in a per curiam
opinion.
5 See infra notes 28-32, 133-48 and accompanying text.
6 Commentators have advocated a broader approach than those employed by the
Court for questions of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF
THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, OFFICIAL DRAFT
§ 1312, at 187-207 (1969) (advocating extending federal jurisdiction to cases where dis-
positive federal defense exists to state cause of action) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY];
Mishkin, The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953) (arguing
that face of declaratory complaint test should replace Skelly Oil rule for determining
existence of federal jurisdiction in actions for declaratory judgment).
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proach to questions of federal jurisdiction, the Court's treatment of
declaratory judgment actions is misguided.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
In general, actions brought in state court that could have been
brought originally in federal court under federal question jurisdic-
tion 7 may be removed to federal court by the defendant. 8 The
Supreme Court developed the well-pleaded complaint rule to guide
federal courts in their exercise of original and, derivatively,9 re-
moval jurisdiction. The rule provides that no federal question juris-
diction exists unless the face of the plaintiff's complaint, properly
pleaded, presents a federal question.' 0
The most influential case applying the well-pleaded complaint
rule in the removal context is Gully v. First National Bank.' In Gully,
the Mississippi state tax collector brought suit in state court claim-
ing that the defendant national bank had failed to pay tax liabilities
assumed from a predecessor corporation.1 2 The defendant bank re-
moved the action to federal district court, where it prevailed on the
merits. 13 The court of appeals affirmed, noting that removal was
appropriate because the power for states to tax national banks "has
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). Federal question jurisdiction exists over "all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." See gener-
ally Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under," 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 978, 981-90 (1979) (dis-
cussion and criticism of "arising under" requirement for federal jurisdiction).
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982):
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defend-
ant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
The Supreme Court first stated the well-pleaded complaint rule in Gold-Washing &
Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
9 Removal jurisdiction may only be exercised derivatively, meaning that only those
cases which could properly have been brought in either federal or state court may be
removed. An action brought in state court within exclusive federal jurisdiction may not
be removed. Instead, such a case must be dismissed by the state court and refiled in
federal court. See General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 287-88
(1922); see also C. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 38, at 212 (4th ed. 1983).
10 See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936). Prior to 1887, a fed-
eral defense could provide the basis for removal. See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102
U.S. 135 (1880). Congress then amended the removal statute to allow removal only
where original federal jurisdiction existed. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as
amended Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. See Tennessee v. Union & Planters'
Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894) (first application of amended removal statute).
11 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
12 Id.at 111.
13 Id. at 112.
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its origin and measure in ... the provisions of a federal statute." 14
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Cardozo,
reversed for lack of federal jurisdiction. Applying the well-pleaded
complaint rule, the Court held that in order for a case to be re-
moved to federal court, the federal issue must be an essential ele-
ment of the plaintiff's cause of action. 15 The Court stated that a
"genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible or conjec-
tural one, must exist, . . . and the controversy must be disclosed
upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the
petition for removal." 16
Applying this principle, the Court held that the suit in Gully was
founded on state, not federal law, making removal inappropriate. 17
The tax obligation arose out of a state law contract enforceable
without reference to federal law. 18 The defendant national bank
had agreed to pay the tax liabilities of its predecessor, but asserted
that a federal controversy existed because no valid debt existed un-
less the original tax levy on the predecessor bank conformed to fed-
eral statutory requirements.' 9 The Court, however, noted that state
law could be dispositive of the case, without reaching the federal
issue.20 The Court concluded:
The most one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in
the background, just as farther in the background there lurks a
question of constitutional law, the question of state power in our
federal form of government. A dispute so doubtful and conjec-
tural, so far removed from plain necessity, is unavailing to extin-
guish the jurisdiction of the states. 2'
In Gully, application of the well-pleaded complaint rule precluded
removal because the defendant, not the plaintiff, raised the federal
issue.
Just as the defendant cannot create federal jurisdiction in the
answer, the plaintiff cannot manufacture federal jurisdiction by an-
14 Id. (citation omitted).
15 According to justice Cardozo, an asserted federal right or immunity is an essen-
tial element of the cause of action when "[t]he right or immunity. . . will be supported
if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and
defeated if they receive another." Id. at 112.
16 Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
17 See id. at 114-18.
18 Id. at 114.
19 Id. at 115.
20 See id. at 117. State law could be dispositive because the tax collector "will have
to prove that state law has been obeyed before the question will be reached whether
anything in its provisions or in administrative conduct under it is inconsistent with the
federal rule." Id.
21 Id. All questions of federal jurisdiction invoke concern over the infringement by
federal courts upon the jurisdiction of state courts. See generally Hart, The Relations Be-
tween State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
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ticipating federal defenses to state law claims.22 Nor can a plaintiff
gain access to a federal forum by alleging federal questions unneces-
sary to prove the claim.23
A plaintiff, as master of his claim, 24 may avoid federal jurisdic-
tion by foregoing available federal remedies and relying solely upon
22 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974) (no federal juris-
diction where plaintiffs invocation of Helium Act Amendments of 1960 and National
Gas Act in complaint merely constitute anticipated defenses); Gully, 299 U.S. at 113
("complaint itself will not avail as a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a
statement of the plaintiff's cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable de-
fense"); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (plaintiff cannot estab-
lish federal jurisdiction by alleging anticipated defense to state cause of action).
Mottley, the most famous application of the well-pleaded complaint rule, exemplifies
significant criticism of the rule: faithful application of the rule may delay the necessary
determination of a federal question. Cf. Trautman, Federal RightJurisdiction and the Declar-
atory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REV. 445, 468-71 (1954) (proposes allowing federal jurisdiction
when determination of federal issue will control outcome). In Mottley, the parties con-
tested the validity of free passes that the Louisville & Nashville Railroad had given them
in 1871 to settle a claim for damages. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 150-51. In 1906, Congress
prohibited free travel on railroads and the railroad subsequently refused to honor the
passes. The Mottleys sued in federal court for specific performance alleging that the
1906 act did not apply to them, and, in the alternative, that the act could not constitu-
tionally be applied to them. The Supreme Court applied the well-pleaded complaint
rule and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the plaintiffs simply
stated a cause of action for specific performance to remedy a breach of a state law con-
tract. Id. at 152-53. The application or validity of the 1906 act could therefore only
enter the suit as a defense to this breach of contract action. The Court thus denied
jurisdiction. Id. at 154. The Mottleys then sought relief in Kentucky state court. Again,
they were successful. The railroad appealed an adverse decision on the merits to the
Supreme Court. Three years after they first heard the case, the Supreme Court finally
decided the federal issue and upheld the application of the statute to the Mottleys. Lou-
isville & Nash. R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
23 See Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 489-91 (1917). The rule against overplead-
ing to create jurisdiction has particular applicability to land disputes which are often
based on ancient forms of action. For example, a plaintiffin possession of land acquired
by federal title may sue in a federal court to enjoin another from using that land, be-
cause an allegation concerning the federal title raises a federal question. See Lancaster v.
Kathleen Oil Co., 241 U.S. 551 (1916). Cf. Hopkins, 244 U.S. at 289-91 (allegation that
plaintiffhas federal title to land raises federal question in suit to remove cloud). A plain-
tiff out of possesssion must bring an action of ejectment in order to regain possession.
In an ejectment action, however, pleading allegations concerning title are inappropriate.
Thus an allegation that plaintiff has federal title does not create federal jurisdiction. See
White v. Sparkhill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500, 510-12 (1930). These formalistic distinc-
tions seem to be based on outmoded forms of action. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note
9, § 18, at 100-01. The Supreme Court has recently indicated that it will relax this rule
in appropriate circumstances. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661 (1974) (federal jurisdiction exists in ordinary ejectment action brought by
Indian tribe where tribe added allegation of ownership under federal statute). Never-
theless, Justice Rehnquist warned in his concurring opinion that "It]he general stan-
dards for determining federal jurisdiction, and, in particular, the standards for
evaluating compliance with the well-pleaded complaint rule, will retain their traditional
vigor tomorrow as today." Id. at 684.
24 The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("Of course, the
party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon.") (Holmes, J.)
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state law.2 5 A plaintiff may not, however, defeat federal jurisdiction
by artfully pleading the complaint to disguise an essentially federal
claim. 26 The actual nature of the claim, not merely the plaintiff's
characterization of it, determines whether federal jurisdiction exists
and thus whether the defendant may remove.2 7
25 See, e.g., Great N. Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918) ("[t]he plaintiff may
by the allegations of his complaint determine the status with respect to removability of a
case"); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 575 (7th Cir. 1982) ("A
plaintiff who has both federal and state causes of action may choose to ignore the federal
claims and pursue only the state claims in state court."); Warner Bros. Records v. R.A.
Ridges Distrib. Co., 475 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1973) ("It is for the plaintiffs to design
their case as one arising under federal law or not, and it is not within the power of the
defendants to change the character of plaintiffs case by inserting allegations in the peti-
tion for removal.").
26 See Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) ("courts 'will
not permit plaintiff to use artful pleading to close off defendant's right to a federal fo-
rum ... [and] occasionally the removal court will seek to determine whether the real
nature of the claim is federal, regardless of plaintiffs characterization.' ") (quoting 14 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722, at 564-66
(1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; see also Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem.
Corp., 677 F.2d at 575 ("The defendant is entitled to have the case removed to federal
court. . . if the plaintiff is attempting to avoid having an essentially federal claim adjudi-
cated in a federal forum by artfully drawing the complaint in terms of state law."). When
a court may appropriately look beyond the face of the complaint to determine federal
jurisdiction is a matter of dispute. See 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 3734. For example,
some courts have held that ifjurisdiction depends on the parties having a certain federal
status, then courts may appropriately look to the answer or the petition for removal to
ascertain that status. See, e.g., Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278,
280 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (court looked beyond complaint to determine whether union had
status as representative of employees engaged in industry affecting commerce); George
D. Roper Corp. v. Local 16, Store, Furnace & Allied Appliance Workers, 279 F. Supp.
717 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (court looked beyond complaint to petition for removal to deter-
mine whether parties operated in industry affecting commerce). See also Ulichny v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 309 F. Supp. 437 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (court looked beyond complaint to see
whether party had status as holder of federally registered trademark). In La Chemise La
Coste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937 (1975),
the Third Circuit rejected removal jurisdiction based only on a party's status noting that
"inferior federal courts should not attempt to engraft exceptions contrary to the legisla-
tive policy so zealousy protected by the Supreme Court." Id. at 345.
27 See Clinton v. Hueston, 308 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1962) (plaintiff's complaint stated
facts which made his cause of action one under Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401
(1982), and therefore removable); Produce Terminal Realty Corp. v. New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co., 116 F. Supp. 451, 453 (D. Mass. 1953) (although plaintiff's claim set forth
common law contract action, real nature of claim arose out of Interstate Commerce Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)); Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade
Council, 93 F. Supp. 217, 219 (D. Me. 1950) (complaint which states state action to
enjoin strike actually states claim under Taft-Hartley Act and is removable).
Though lower federal courts have often employed the artful pleading doctrine, see
14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, § 3722 n.35 (citing cases), the Supreme Court's
only treatment of artful pleading provides little guidance. See Federated Dep't Stores v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981). In Moirie, the plaintiffs filed a state antitrust action. The
plaintiffs had earlier filed a federal antitrust action against the same defendants that the
federal court had dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing. The defendants re-
moved the state case to federal court and moved for dismissal on the ground of res
judicata. Id. at 395-96. The Supreme Court upheld the removal because the plaintiffs
1985]
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Some courts have articulated a second restriction on a plaintiff's
ability to avoid federal jurisdiction. Such courts have adopted a rule
that permits a defendant to remove a plaintiffs state law claim if
federal law preempts the state law upon which the plaintiff has re-
lied.28 Such courts allow removal because federal law provides the
only remedy available to the plaintiff, regardless of what the plaintiff
has asserted in the complaint. For example, in Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge No. 735,29 the plaintiff sued in state court to enjoin a strike by
the defendants, alleging that a strike would violate a no-strike clause
in a collective bargaining agreement between the parties. After the
state court granted the injunction, the defendants removed to a fed-
eral district court which dissolved the injunction. 30 The Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed both the removal and the dissolution of the injunction,
holding that "[s]tate law does not exist as an independent source of
private rights to enforce collective bargaining contracts" and the
"force of Federal preemption in this area of labor law cannot be
state antitrust claims were "essentially federal law claims," and thus plaintiffs had used
artful pleading to avoid federal jurisdiction. Id. at 397 n.2. The plaintiffs could have
initially brought either federal or state law antitrust claims; the Court's characterization
of their state remedy as essentially federal in character therefore seems questionable.
The Court relegated the jurisdictional discussion to a single footnote devoid of reason-
ing. Id. In dissent, Justice Brennan sharply criticized the majority for neglecting the
well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. at 404-11.
The decision in Moitie may signal the Supreme Court's acceptance of the artful
pleading doctrine. Nevertheless, because of the unique circumstances of Moitie, the case
should not be read as relaxing the requirements of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
The first suit was filed and dismissed in federal court and federal law governs the res
judicata effect of the dismissal. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 100A, at 694-96. The
Supreme Court could have simply denied the removal and directed the state court to
apply federal resjudicata law and dismiss the action. In its haste to apply resjudicata to
the plaintiffs, however, the Court ignored the troubling implications of the removal
question. For a full discussion of the issues in Moitie, see Note, Federated Department
Stores v. Moitie: Removal and Relitigation Reappraised, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 989.
The Supreme Court's strict application of the well-pleaded complaint rule in
Franchise Tax Board indicates that the rule has not been undermined by Moitie. 103 S. Ct.
at 2848.
28 See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 390
U.S. 557 (1968) (plaintiff's state law breach of contract claim preempted by § 301 of
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-531 (1982)). The removal
of the state court action on the grounds of federal preemption occurs often under the
LMRA because of the firmly established preemptive nature of that statute. See generally
Note, Intimations of Federal Removal Jurisdiction in Labor Cases: The Pleadings Nerus, 1981
DUKE L.J. 743. Courts have also permitted preemption removal in other contexts. See,
e.g., McKinney v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 624 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1980) (Rail-
way Labor Act); Bailey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979)
(Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933); Baines v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 440 F. Supp. 15
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (National Flood Insurance Act of 1968); Sweeney v. Morgan Drive
Away, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Colo. 1975) (Carmack Amendment to Interstate Com-
merce Act). For a discussion of cases on the preemption exception, see Billy Jack For
Her, Inc. v. New York Coat & Allied Workers, 511 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
29 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
30 Id. at 338-39.
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avoided by failing to mention Section 301 [of the Labor Manage-
ment Relation Act (LMRA)] in the complaint." 31
Other courts rejectAvco and do not allow removal based on fed-
eral preemption. Such courts characterize preemption as an affirm-
ative defense to a state law action, and conclude that it cannot
support removal. 32
B. Declaratory Judgments and Federal Jurisdiction
1. Federal Declaratory Judgment Actions
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act3 3 presents unique
problems for the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule. In
a declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff brings an action for a
declaration of the legal rights of the parties in order to avoid a coer-
cive action between the parties. 34 Because the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act has been construed as having no effect on jurisdiction, 35 it
is necessary to determine what constitutes the face of the complaint
in order to apply the well-pleaded complaint rule and determine
whether federal jurisdiction exists.36 Prior to Franchise Tax Board,
the Supreme Court addressed this problem in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co. 37 and Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co. ,38 where it
developed the rule that the nature of the plaintiff's potential coer-
cive action determines whether federal jurisdiction exists.
In Skelly Oil, Skelly Oil Co. contracted to sell natural gas to Phil-
lips Petroleum Co., which in turn would resell the gas to the Michi-
gan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co. The contract gave Skelly Oil the right
to cancel if, by December 1, 1946, the Federal Power Commission
31 IId. at 340 (citations omitted).
32 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 851 (9th Cir.
1980) ("assertion of preemption is a defense to plaintiff's state law claim and not a ground
for federal jurisdiction") (emphasis in original); see also Trent Realty Ass'n v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan, 657 F.2d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 1981) ("we can find no basis for removal jurisdic-
tion in the anticipated defense of federal preemption); Washington v. American League
of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 660 (1972) (assertion that plaintiff's attack
on televising agreements of league games is preempted by federal law cannot form basis
for removal); Martin v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co., 567 F. Supp. 304, 310 (M.D. Pa.
1983) ("the issue of federal preemption is merely an affirmative defense to the Plaintiff's
state law claims and, as such, is an insufficient predicate for removal"). For the Supreme
Court's treatment of this issue in Franchise Tax Board, see infra notes 133-48 and accom-
panying text.
33 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
34 See Note, Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REv. 787,
802-03 (1949).
35 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).
36 See Mishkin, supra note 6, at 176-84; Trautman, supra note 22, at 463-68; Note,
supra note 34, at 802-03.
37 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
38 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
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had not issued a "certificate of public convenience and necessity" to
Michigan-Wisconsin to approve the building of a pipeline. 39 On
November 30, 1946, the Federal Power Commission notified Michi-
gan-Wisconsin that it would issue the required certificate, subject to
certain specified conditions, but did not make public the certificate
until December 2, after Skelly Oil had notified Phillips that it was
cancelling the contract.40
Phillips sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that the
contract was still in effect.4 1 Phillips sought declaration that the
Federal Power Commission's statement on November 30 consti-
tuted an actual issuance of the certificate, and that, notwithstanding
the conditions attached to the certificate, it constituted a "certificate
of public convenience and necessity" within the meaning of the Nat-
ural Gas Act and the contracts.42 Despite the presence of federal
issues, the Supreme Court held that no federal jurisdiction
existed. 43
On its face, Phillips's request for federal declaratory judgment
called for an interpretation of the Natural Gas Act.44 The Court felt
constrained, however, to look beyond the face of the declaratory
complaint to the underlying conventional action which Phillips
could have brought. Had the Court not looked to the underlying
action, the Declaratory Judgment Act would have served as a device
for artful pleading, bringing siate claims into federal court 45 in vio-
lation of the observation that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not
extend federal court jurisdiction.46
Phillips's underlying action for breach of contract was a state
law action and thus could not be brought in federal court absent
diversity of citizenship. A federal question of interpretation of the
Natural Gas Act would arise in such a state breach of contract action
only if and when Skelly Oil raised the defense that a "certificate of
public convenience and necessity" had never been issued within the
meaning of the Act.47 The Court applied the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule to the plaintiff's claim in the underlying cause of action,
which did not contain a federal question.48 Because the federal is-
sue arose only in anticipation of a defense, it provided an insuffi-
39 Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 669.
40 Id. at 669-70.
41 Id. at 671.
42 Id. at 670-71.
43 Id. at 674.
44 Id. at 670-71.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 671.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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cient basis for federal jurisdiction. 49 Allowing Phillips to sue in
federal court simply because it sought a declaratory judgment
would, thus, distort the limited procedural purpose of the Declara-
tory Judgment Act.50
Skelly Oil indicates that a federal court in a declaratory judgment
action must look to the underlying coercive action which the plain-
tiff could have brought in order to determine whether federal juris-
diction exists. In many declaratory actions, however, the functional
position of the litigants is reversed as a declaratory plaintiff seeks
relief in anticipation of a coercive action brought by the defend-
ant.5 1 In Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co.,52 the Supreme Court,
in dictum, suggested that in such circumstances it is appropriate to
look to the action which the defendant could have brought in order
to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists.
In Wycoff, the plaintiff, who allegedly transported motion pic-
ture films and newsreels in interstate commerce, sought a declara-
tory judgment in federal court that it was engaging in interstate
commerce and therefore immune from regulation by Utah's Public
Service Commission. 53 The Supreme Court dismissed the com-
plaint for want of a showing of an actual controversy between the
parties, 54 but proceeded to discuss whether federal jurisdiction
existed. 55
The Court noted that federal jurisdiction would be improper,
even in the event of an actual controversy between the parties, be-
cause the federal issue raised by Wycoff, immunity from state regu-
lation, could arise only as a defense to a state action by the
Commission against Wycoff to enforce its regulations.56 The cause
of action that the Commission could have asserted did not arise
under federal law, and Wycoff could not create federal jurisdiction
by seeking a declaratory judgment to establish the validity of a fed-
eral defense to that state cause of action.57
The test that emerges from Skelly Oil and Wycoff for jurisdiction
over federal declaratory judgment actions is that the federal courts,
out of deference to the relationship between federal and state law,
must look beyond the face of the declaratory complaint, to the face
of the underlying coercive action that could have been brought in
49 Id. at 673-74; see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
50 Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 673-74; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51 Note, supra note 34, at 802-03.
52 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
53 Id. at 239.
54 Id. at 245-46.
55 Id. at 248-49.
56 Id. at 248.
57 Id.
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the absence of a claim for declaratory relief.58 In both Skelly Oil and
Wycoff, this underlying coercive action arose under state law making
original federal jurisdiction inappropriate.
2. State Declaratory Judgment Actions and Federal Jurisdiction
Prior to Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court had never ad-
dressed the removability of declaratory judgment actions brought in
state court for declarations of federal law. The Third Circuit ad-
dressed this issue in La Chemise LaCoste v. Alligator Co., 59 where it de-
clined to apply the rule of Skelly Oil to the removal context. 60 In La
Chemise, La Chemise La Coste, a French corporation, claimed a com-
mon law trademark over certain emblems. Alligator, a Delaware
corporation, held a federally registered trademark over these em-
blems. La Chemise La Coste sought a declaration in state court of
its ownership and right to use these emblems, and an injunction
against Alligator using them anywhere in the United States. 6 1 Alli-
gator removed to federal district court.62
Citing Wycoff, the district court looked to the action which the
declaratory defendant, Alligator, could have brought against the de-
claratory plaintiff, La Chemise La Coste. The action underlying La
Chemise La Coste's declaratory judgment action was a threatened
federal patent infringement suit by Alligator, and the district court
held that a federal question was properly presented. 63 On appeal,
the Third Circuit held that Wycoffapplied only to federal declaratory
judgment actions, and refused to extend the rule to state declara-
58 A number of commentators have suggested applying the well-pleaded complaint
rule to the face of the declaratory complaint rather than to the underlying coercive ac-
tion. If the face of the declaratory complaint reveals a need to determine a substantial
federal right, then federal jurisdiction is proper. See Mishkin, supra note 6, at 177-84.
Professor Mishkin argues that the Supreme Court did not have to give extended consid-
eration to the declaratory procedure in Skelly Oil, because the face of the declaratory
complaint test would reveal that the rights needed to be determined under state contract
law not the federal Natural Gas Act. Id. at 183-84. See also ALI STUDY, supra note 6,
§ 1311, at 170-72 (if initial pleading in declaratory judgment proceeding shows substan-
tial federal claim, federal jurisdiction exists); Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on
FederalJurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 395, 478-82 (1976) (same); Trautman, supra note 22,
at 463-68. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of this issue in Franchise
Tax Bd., see infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
59 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937 (1974).
60 Id. at 343-45.
61 Id. at 341.
62 Id.
63 La Chemise La Coste v. Alligator Co., 313 F. Supp. 915, 917-18 (D. Del. 1970),
rev'd, 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937 (1974). The district court also
asserted jurisdiction because the case involved the ascertainment of the status of a fed-
eral trademark holder. It was, therefore, appropriate to look beyond the complaint. 313
F. Supp. at 917-18 (citing Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, 98 F. Supp. 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Ulichny v. General Elec. Co., 309 F. Supp. 437 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)). See
generally supra note 26.
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tory judgment actions.64 Due to the reversed positions of the liti-
gants in a declaratory judgment action,65 defendant Alligator was in
reality a "functional plaintiff." 66 Because "a plaintiff may not re-
move an action to federal court[,] . . . [t]o allow a defendant in a
state declaratory [judgment] action to remove, therefore, would ac-
cord to 'functional plaintiffs' a right not given other plaintiffs." 67
The Court then applied the well-pleaded complaint rule to the face
of the complaint unaided by the removal petition and found that no
federal jurisdiction existed because questions concerning La Che-
mise's right to use the emblems raised only state law issues.68
II
THE CASE
The Franchise Tax Board of California, the state agency
charged with collecting state personal income taxes, brought two
causes of action in state court against Construction Laborers Vaca-
tion Trust (CLVT).69 First, the Board sought enforcement of a levy
against funds held by CLVT for the payment of back taxes owed by
three of the trust's members. 70 Second, the Board sought a declara-
tory judgment that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)71 did not preempt the levy, and that CLVT was bound to
honor future levies of the Board.72 CLVT removed to the District
Court for the Central District of California, contending that ERISA
preempted the state tax levy. 73 The district court upheld federalju-
64 La Chemisee La Coste, 506 F.2d at 341-45.
65 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
66 506 F.2d at 343 n.4.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 343-44. The Third Circuit also noted that even if Skelly Oil and Wycoff ap-
plied, it would still deny jurisdiction because where a federal claim is only one of three
possible trademark actions that the threatening party could bring, an averment of the
federal action in the complaint for declaratory judgment will not provide the basis for
removal jurisdiction. Id. at 345-46. For a critical discussion of La Chemise, see Note,
Removal-State Declaratoty Judgment Actions Based on Federal Question Jurisdiction, 17 B.C. IN-
DUS. & COM. L. REv. 72 (1975).
Franchise Tax Board held that Skelly Oil and Wycoff applied to state declaratory judg-
ments actions, 103 S. Ct. at 2851, thus repudiating La Chemise.
69 CLVT was a welfare benefit plan within the meaning of § 3 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1) (1982). See Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2844.
70 The Board's complaint demanded money damages not to exceed $380.56 plus
interest for unpaid state personal income taxes.
71 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
72 103 S. Ct. at 2844-45. Declaratory judgment was sought under the California
declaratory relief statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1060 (West 1980).
73 The litigants did not dispute CLVT's status as a "welfare benefit plan" within the
meaning of § 3 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982). Section 514(a) of ERISA
preempts "any and all state laws" which "relate to any employee benefit plan," 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a), such as the Construction Laborers' trust at issue. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1)-(3). Thus, if the tax levy "relates to" the trust, § 514(a) precludes enforce-
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risdiction, and held for the Board on the merits.74 The Ninth Circuit
reversed without questioning jurisdiction, and held that ERISA pre-
empted the state tax levy. 75 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Brennan, reversed for lack ofjurisdiction,
and did not reach the ERISA preemption question. 76
The Court found that state law provided the sole basis for the
Board's causes of action. As a result, application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule barred federal jurisdiction. The first cause of action,
the enforcement of the state tax levy, arose under California law,
and a federal issue, that ERISA barred the levy, entered the dispute
only as a defense to the levy. 77 Because the plaintiff's claim arose
solely under state law, straightforward application of the well-
pleaded complaint rule barred federal jurisdiction over the Board's
first cause of action.78
The Board's second cause of action, for a declaration that ER-
ISA did not preempt the levy, posed a more difficult problem for the
Court.79 The Court noted that the scope of the preemptive effect of
ERISA was the sole issue presented in the declaratory complaint as
there could be no relief for the plaintiff "without a construction of
ERISA and/or an adjudication of its preemptive effect and constitu-
tionality-all questions of federal law."8 0 Thus, the face of the
plaintiff's well-pleaded declaratory complaint presented a federal
question.
The Court, however, declined to adopt a face of the declaratory
complaint test. Instead, it applied the rule of Skelly Oil, developed
for declaratory judgment actions brought in federal court,81 to ac-
tions for declaratory judgments brought in state court. Therefore,
in order to determine whether removal jurisdiction exists, a court
must look to the nature of the underlying claim which either party
ment of the levy. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has broadly construed the "re-
late to" language of § 514(a). See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983) (New
York's Human Rights Law relates to employee benefit plans); Alessi v. Raybestos-Man-
hattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981) (New Jersey workers compensation law indirectly
relates to employee benefit plan and is preempted by ERISA).
74 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2845.
75 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983). Circuit Judge Tank, in dissent, argued that
under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the federal court had no jurisdiction and that
even conceding jurisdiction, ERISA would not preempt the state tax levy. 679 F.2d at
1309, 1312-13.
76 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983).
77 Id. at 2848. The Board brought suit to enforce the levy pursuant to CAL. REV. &
TAX CODE § 18831 (West 1983).
78 103 S. Ct. at 2847-48 (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936)).
79 103 S. Ct. at 2849.
80 Id.
81 See supra notes 33-58 and accompanying text.
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could have brought against the other.8 2 Skelly Oil did not require
such a test, turning in part on the congressional intention concern-
ing the Declaratory Judgment Act,8 3 but fidelity to its principles re-
quired examination of the possible coercive actions underlying the
state declaratory judgment action. Otherwise, an action could be
brought in state court for an interpretation of federal law and then
removed, even if such a declaratory action could not have been
brought in federal court.8 4
Applying the Skelly Oil rule to the facts of Franchise Tax Board,
the Court found that the coercive action underlying the declaratory
claim was a suit by CLVT to enjoin a tax levy against the trust.8 5
ERISA provides exclusive federal jurisdiction for such an injunctive
action by CLVT and, thus, application of Skelly Oil would permit re-
moval.86 The Court created an exception to the Skelly Oil rule, how-
ever, holding that deference to state governments dictated that a
suit brought by a state in its own court to determine the validity of
its own law should not be snatched from state court.8 7
After denying federal jurisdiction over the Board's two causes
of action, the Court considered CLVT's contention that the pre-
emptive effect of ERISA supported federal jurisdiction and that re-
moval was therefore appropriate.88 Analogizing to Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge No. 735,89 CLVT argued that the preemptive power of ERISA
superseded all state law causes of action and thus the Board's com-
plaint was in substance a claim under federal law.90 The Court held
that in order for preemption to support removal, the rights that the
plaintiff sought to assert had to be of central concern to the federal
statute involved, and that federal law must not merely afford a de-
fense to a state law claim, but must deprive the plaintiff of the state
cause of action. The Court denied removal because although
ERISA provided a possible defense to the state tax levy, it did not
82 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2851.
83 Id. at 2850-5 1; see also Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 880; supra notes 46-50 and accompa-
nying text.
84 103 S. Ct. at 2851.
85 Id. at 2851-52.
86 Id. at 2851-52 & n.20, 2854 n.26. ERISA' § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1)
(1982), provides exclusive federal jurisdiction over any action brought by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary of a benefit plan or the Secretary of Labor to enjoin any act
inconsistent with the provisions of a benefit plan. The Court in Franchise Tax Bd. de-
clined to reach the question whether a suit to enjoin a state tax levy on an ERISA-cov-
ered trust would be barred from the federal courts by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1982). Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2852 n.21.
87 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2852-53.
88 Id. at 2353-55.
89 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), afd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). Avco is discussed supra
notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
90 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2853.
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supersede the power to bring the levy by replacing it with a federal
cause of action.9 1
III
ANALYSIS
A. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Applied
The Court's denial of removal jurisdiction over the Board's first
cause of action, the enforcement of the state tax levy, involved a
straightforward application of the well-pleaded complaint rule. The
Court reaffirmed the longstanding principle that a federal defense
to a state law cause of action will not, by itself, provide the basis for
original or removal jurisdiction. 92 In Franchise Tax Board, the Cali-
fornia law providing for the enforcement of state tax levies formed
the law of the complaint. 93 CLVT's contention that ERISA, a fed-
eral statute, gave it immunity from the levy was merely a defense to
the application of state law.9 4
Various authorities argue that federal jurisdiction and therefore
removal jurisdiction should be allowed on the basis of a federal de-
fense.95 They contend that a federal forum should be available
whenever a substantial federal question must be litigated, whether it
enters the case by way of the complaint or the answer.96 Ensuring a
federal forum would provide greater uniformity in federal law and
guard against misapplication of federal law by state courts. 97
In Franchise Tax Board, CLVT's asserted defense to the state tax
levy, that ERISA preempted it, was substantial and potentially dis-
91 Id. at 2854-55.
92 Id. at 2845-48. In applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court stated:
[S]ince 1887 it has been settled law that a case may not be removed to
federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of
preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs complaint,
and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly
at issue in the case.
Id. at 2848. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); see also supra notes 22-23 and accompanying
text. Prior to Franchise Tax Bd., the Court had faced a similar question in Gully. For a
discussion of Gully, see supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
93 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2848.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 6, § 1312, at 25-28, 187-207; Trautman, supra
note 22, at 745.
96 See ALI STUDY, supra note 6, at 189-92.
97 Id. In addition to proposing federal defense removal, the ALI proposes to allow
both plaintiffs and defendants to remove. Id. § 1312(a)(2). The ALI would permit
either party to remove on the basis of a federal defense to avoid a potential unsympa-
thetic construction of federal law. Id. at 191-94. The ALI would limit federal defense
removal to cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $ 10,000 in order to avoid the
use of federal defense removal as an extortionate tactic where the amount in controversy
is small. Id. § 1312(a)(2), at 194-96.
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positive of the action.98 Therefore, under a federal defense jurisdic-
tional approach, CLVT would be permitted to remove.99 The
adoption of such an approach, however, would be unwise. The well-
pleaded complaint rule preserves the proper relationship between
state and federal courts and operates more efficiently than would
federal defense jurisdiction.
The well-pleaded complaint rule properly strikes the balance
between state and federal jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of
limited, not general jurisdiction. 10 0 The Supreme Court has nar-
rowly construed the jurisdiction of the federal courts to avoid intru-
sions upon the jurisdiction of the state courts whenever possible.' 0 '
The well-pleaded complaint rule preserves the jurisdiction of state
courts by excluding cases predominantly founded upon state law
from federal courts.' 0 2 Even though the well-pleaded complaint
rule operates to exclude federal issues raised in defense from fed-
eral court, the supremacy clause 0 3 requires state courts to enforce
federal rights faithfully, and the Supreme Court has the power to
remedy state court misapplications of federal law.' 0 4
The well-pleaded complaint rule is more efficient than federal
98 See Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2843. In fact, whether ERISA preempted the
state tax levy was the only point that the parties disputed. Id.
99 Actually, under the ALI proposal, CLVT would be unable to remove because of a
proposed exception to federal defense removal. The ALI would not allow a defendant
to remove an action "brought by a State. . . ,or an officer or agency of a State. . . ,to
enforce the statues, ordinances, or administrative regulations of such State." ALI
STUDY, supra note 6, § 1312(b)(6). The ALI would bar removal because "proper respect
for the states suggests that they should be allowed to use their own courts for routine
matters of law enforcement." Id. at 201.
100 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 7, at 10; see also Hart, supra note 22, at 495 ("As to
certain matters, federal law assumes and accepts the basic responsibility of the states,
and seeks simply to regulate the exercise of state authority").
101 See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941). In Shamrock
Oil the Court noted that
[t]he power reserved to the states under the Constitution to provide for
the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only
by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the
Constitution. "Due regard for the rightful independence of state govern-
ments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupu-
lously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute
has defined."
Id. at 108-09 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)). See also Hart, supra note
21, at 495.
102 The Supreme Court in Skelly Oil expressed concern'about keeping the docket of
federal courts manageable, and avoiding potential misapplication of state law. 339 U.S.
at 673.
103 The supremacy clause reads in part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;. . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cI. 2.
104 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
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defense removal. Federal defense removal creates uncertainty be-
cause the significance of a federal defense to a state law cause of
action may not be evident from the initial pleadings. The availabil-
ity of the federal defense may not become apparent until subse-
quent pleadings or trial. Thus, in some cases, the grounds for
federal defense to support removal may not exist until after a sub-
stantial expenditure of time and resources in state court. The well-
pleaded complaint rule allows determination of removal jurisdiction
on the basis of the initial pleading, preventing such a potential waste
of state resources.10 5
The well-pleaded complaint rule provides a convenient rule of
thumb to efficiently allocate cases between federal and state
courts.' 0 6 Concededly, the rule is rigid and excludes from federal
court the determination of substantive federal issues that might
merit a federal forum.'0 7 However, the rule's certainty and effi-
ciency, in addition to its reflection of the proper relationship be-
tween state and federal courts, compensate for its shortcomings.
B. The Application of Skelly Oil to State Declaratory Judgment
Actions
The Board's second cause of action, the state declaratory judg-
ment action, posed a more difficult problem for the Court.10  On its
face, the Board's declaratory judgment complaint asked that the
California state court determine whether ERISA preempted the
state tax levy.' 0 9 Commentators have argued that federal jurisdic-
105 See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 922 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("If the existence of a
federal cause of action depended on the defense, a. . .court could not know whether it
had jurisdiction until the [defendant] answered the complaint, and the well-pleaded
complaint rule. . . was designed to avoid just this kind of uncertainty and confusion."),
affd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980).
106 See Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirements That a Case Arise "Directly" under
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 915-16 (1967). See also Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299
U.S. at 117-18 (countless causes arguably have basis in federal law; the well-pleaded
complaint rule helps determine which deserve federal forum).
107 See Trautman, supra note 22, at 469 (well-pleaded complaint rule improperly fo-
cuses on pleading rules rather than identification of federal issues). Louisville & Nash.
R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), is an excellent example of a case where rigid appli-
cation of the well-pleaded complaint rule delayed the ultimate determination of a sub-
stantial federal issue. See supra note 22.
108 See Franchise Tal Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2849.
109 Id. at 2845. Franchise Tax Board's complaint alleged in pertinent part that,
"The Board. . .contends that defendants [CLVT] are obligated and re-
quired by law to pay over to the Board all amounts held . . . in favor of
the Board's delinquent taxpayers. On the other hand, defendants con-
tend that section 514 of ERISA preempts state law and that the trustees
lack the power to honor the levies made upon them by the State of
California.
. .. [D]efendants will continue to refuse to honor the Board's levies in
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tion should exist if the face of a complaint for declaratory judgment
discloses a substantial federal issue. 10 The Court, however, re-
jected a face of the declaratory complaint test. Instead, the Court
extended the rule developed in Skelly Oil for federal declaratory
judgment actions to state declaratory judgment actions, and held
that a court must look to the nature of the underlying-coercive ac-
tion to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists."' By re-
jecting a face of the declaratory complaint test, the Court missed an
opportunity to simplify the jurisdictional approach to declaratory
judgment actions. Furthermore, the Court misapplied Skelly Oil to
the facts, which will create even more confusion over the proper ju-
risdictional analysis for declaratory judgment complaints.
Courts should apply the well-pleaded complaint rule to the face
of the declaratory complaint, rather than to the underlying coercive
action, because the face of the declaratory complaint rule is easier to
apply and provides greater certainty than the Skelly Oil rule. 112
Under such an approach, a court would determine whether federal
jurisdiction exists from the actual pleading filed, rather than on the
speculative basis of a hypothetical coercive action that could have
been brought by one of the parties. 113 By limiting the inquiry to the
face of the declaratory complaint, and the actual issues placed in
dispute, a court can quickly and readily determine jurisdiction from
what is placed in controversy. 114 A party who could bring either
state or federal claims exemplifies the inadequacy of the speculative
inquiry mandated by Skelly Oil. Such a party could legitimately
choose to forego the federal claims in order to avoid federal juris-
diction. 1 5 Yet under Skelly Oil, a court would look to those claims
which the party might be willing to forego in order to establish
jurisdiction.
A face of the declaratory complaint rule would not violate the
limited procedural purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act.116
The prohibitions against federal jurisdiction based on an anticipa-
tion of a federal defense or artful pleading provide ample protection
against an unwarranted expansion of federal jurisdiction due to the
this regard. Accordingly, a declaration by this court of the parties' re-
spective rights is required to fully and finally resolve this controversy."
Id. (quoting from Franchise Tax Board's Complaint at 8-9).
11o See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 6, § 1311, 170-72; Mishkin, supra note 6, at 177-
84; Trautman, supra note 22, at 463-68.
1 Franchise Tav Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2851; see also supra notes 33-58 and accompanying
text (discussing development of Skelly Oil rule).
112 See Mishkin, supra note 6, at 181.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
116 See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671; see also supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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procedural posture of a declaratory judgment action. 1 7 A court
could determine from the face of the declaratory complaint whether
a substantial federal question was presented, or whether a party was
seeking improperly to gain access to a federal forum through artful
pleading. For example, in Skelly Oil, the plaintiff sought a declara-
tion of the continuing effectiveness of a state law contract. The face
of the declaratory complaint in Skelly Oil indicated, therefore, that
the action did not arise under federal law, but state contract law.
Thus, it was not necessary for the Court there to determine that the
underlying coercive action arose under state law in order to deny
federal jurisdiction. 18
Application of the face of the declaratory complaint test to
Franchise Tax Board reveals that the Board's complaint raises a sub-
stantial federal question-the scope of ERISAI '9 -and that removal
would be appropriate. The Court's decision in Franchise Tax Board,
however, forecloses any use of the face of the declaratory complaint
test by federal courts. In Franchise Tax Board, the Court reaffirmed
Skelly Oil, and extended it to state declaratory judgment actions.' 20
The Court held that, as a general rule, declaratory judgment actions
are removable only if the underlying coercive action arises under
federal law. 121
In Franchise Tax Board, the Court applied the rule of Skelly Oil
and looked to the coercive action which the declaratory defendant
CLVT could have brought. Section 502(e)(1) of ERISA grants trust-
ees of ERISA-covered plans the power to sue for injunctive relief to
resolve disputes concerning their rights and duties under ERISA. t 22
In addition, section 502(e)(1) of ERISA provides exclusive federal
jurisdiction over such an injunction.' 23 The Court created an ex-
ception to the Skelly Oil rule and declined to allow removal, asserting
117 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
1t8 See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 670-71; see also Mishkin, supra note 6, at 183 (denial of
jurisdiction appropriate in Skelly Oil under face of declaratory complaint rule). Had the
plaintiff sought a declaration that the federal agency had issued the certificate, it would
have been clear that the plaintiff was seeking merely to plead its state law action in an
artful manner.
119 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2843.
120 Id. at 2850-51.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2852-53. Section 502(e)(1) of ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1)
(1982).
123 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1982). The fact that the declaratory judgment de-
fendant's coercive action would arise under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts does not bar removal. Removal is only barred when the action asserted by the
actual plaintiff in state court arises under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
See supra note 9.
The Court also indicated that even if ERISA did not contain a jurisdictional provi-
sion, CLVT might be able to sue in federal court under the doctrine that a "person
subject to a scheme of federal regulation may sue in federal court to enjoin application
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that "considerations of comity [made the Court] reluctant to snatch
cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State, unless
some clear rule demands it. ' ' 124 The Court noted that a state is not
"prejudiced by an inability to come to federal court for a declaratory
judgment in advance of a possible injunctive suit by a person subject
to federal regulation."' 125 States can enforce their own laws in their
own courts and do not suffer if any federal questions are tested
there. 126 Although ERISA grants certain parties the right to bring
suit in federal court, it does not provide that suits against these par-
ties likewise be cognizable in a federal court. 127 The Court believed
that federal jurisdiction should not govern a suit brought by a state
in its courts for a declaration of the validity of its laws because of the
notions of comity that underlie the well-pleaded complaint rule and
all questions of federal jurisdiction. 128
Although such an exception to the Skelly Oil rule may be argua-
bly justified when the coercive action falls under original federal ju-
risdiction, such an exception should not be recognized when the
coercive action falls under exclusive federal jurisdiction. If the coer-
cive action arises under exclusive federal jurisdiction, any questions
of comity have been already resolved by Congress in favor of federal
jurisdiction. By bestowing exclusive jurisdiction, Congress has de-
termined that certain types of federal rights should be vindicated
only in federal court. If the coercive action would be cognizable
only in federal court, the denial of the removal to federal court of a
state declaratory judgment action that seeks to foreclose that exclu-
sive federal remedy contravenes the intent of Congress. The coer-
cive action in question in Franchise Tax Board, an injunction by CLVT
to bar state interference with an ERISA trust, falls under exclusive
federal jurisdiction.129 Removal therefore should be allowed under
the principles of Skelly Oil. The Court's creation of this exception to
to him of conflicting state regulations, and a declaratory judgment by the same person
does not necessarily run afoul of the Skelly Oil doctrine." Id. at 2852 n.20.
124 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2852 n.22.
125 Id. at 2852.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2852. See § 502 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982).
128 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. As the Court in Franchise Tax Bd.
explained:
The situation presented by a State's suit for a declaration of the validity
of state law is sufficiently removed from the spirit of necessity and careful
limitation of district court jurisdiction that informed our statutory inter-
pretation in Skelly Oil and Gully to convince us that, until Congress in-
forms us otherwise, such a suit is not within the original jurisdiction of
the United States district courts. Accordingly, the same suit brought
originally in state courts is not removable either.
Franchise Tax Bd, 103 S. Ct. at 2852-53 (footnote omitted).
129 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1982).
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Skelly Oil effectively allows the use of the procedural device of the
declaratory judgment to reduce federal jurisdiction in violation of
Skelly Oil's underlying policy.' 30 The Court in Franchise Tax Board
extended Skelly Oil to state declaratory judgment actions to avoid the
contravention of Skelly Oil's observation that the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act did not affect federal jurisdiction.'13 The Court then
violated the policy of Skelly Oil by creating an exception. If the
Board had originally brought suit for a declaration of the inapplica-
bility of ERISA in federal court, federal jurisdiction would exist
since Skelly Oil mandates looking to the underlying coercive action:
a suit by CLVT. The Court has thus reduced federal jurisdiction by
denying the removal of such an action brought in state court
although federal jurisdiction would exist if the action had been orig-
inally brought in federal court.' 32
The Court has thus created a potential race to the courthouse
by enabling a potential defendant to a federal cause of action (in this
instance a state) to close off the potential plaintiff's congressionally
mandated forum by filing a state declaratory judgment action. Fur-
thermore, rather than clarifying determinations ofjurisdiction in de-
claratory judgment actions, the Court has added even more
complexity and confusion to such determinations.
C. Clarification of the Preemption Exception to the Well-
Pleaded Complaint Rule
Finally, the Court considered CLVT's contention that ERISA
preempted the Board's complaint, making the claims, in substance,
ones arising under federal law. 133
Relying on Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,134 CLVT argued
that removal should be permitted because ERISA preempted any
state causes of action involving an interpretation or application of
ERISA.' 35 The Court properly rejected this argument and clarified
130 Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671; see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
'31 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2851 (citing Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671).
132 The Court's action also violates the removal statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982),
which allows the removal of any action which could have originally been brought in
federal court.
133 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2853-55.
134 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), affid, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). See supra notes 29-32
and accompanying text.
135 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2853. In Avco, the plaintiff sued under state law to
enjoin a strike by the defendants which violated a collective bargaining agreement by the
parties. The defendants were allowed to remove to federal court because § 301 of
LMRA was so pervasive in the area of collective bargaining agreements, that no state-
created remedy existed for disputes involving those agreements. See Avco, 376 F.2d at
339-40. Similarly, CLVT argued that ERISA preempted state law, making the Board's
complaint, in substance, a claim under federal law. 103 S. Ct. at 2853.
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the requirements of the preemption exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule. 13 6
In order to remove under the preemption exception, the de-
fendant must show not only that the plaintiff's cause of action affects
a federal right of the defendant, but that the right the plaintiff seeks
to enforce is itself governed by federal law to the exclusion of state
law. 137 In Avco, the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the breach of a
collective bargaining agreement. 138 Although state law would pro-
vide a remedy in the absence of the federal statute, the federal labor
act "displace[d] entirely" any state cause of action for such a breach.
Federal law provided the only remedy available under these circum-
stances to the plaintiff.139 As the Court in Franchise Tax Board ex-
plained, "Avco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of
action completely preempts a state cause of action any complaint
that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily
'arises under' federal law."' 140
In Franchise Tax Board, the plaintiff sought enforcement of a tax
levy, and declaratory judgment that ERISA did not preempt the
state tax levy.' 4 ' Under ERISA, however, only certain named per-
sons may bring causes of action to seek relief in accordance with its
provisions. 42 Thus, unlike Avco where the plaintiff was required to
seek relief under a federal statute, state law provides the only rem-
edy available to the Board to enforce its tax levy. Therefore, even
though ERISA may well preclude enforcement of the tax levy on the
trust, "an action to enforce the levy is not itself preempted by
ERISA."1 43
The Court has thus distinguished between a federal defense to
a state law claim and federal preemption of a state cause of action.
First, when federal law merely operates to provide a defense to a
plaintiff's attempt to enforce a state created right, no removal is per-
mitted. In such a case, the plaintiff asserts a state law right and the
defendant contends that federal law precludes the operation of the
state law right against him. In the second situation, when federal
law deprives the plaintiff of his state law right and replaces it with an
analogous federal right, removal is permitted. In the latter case,
there is no state law to apply because federal law provides the only
cause of action available to the plaintiff.
136 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
137 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2855.
138 Avco, 376 F.2d at 339.
139 Id. at 340.
140 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2854.
141 Id. at 2855.
142 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
143 Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2855.
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Under the Court's analysis, the preemption exception to the
well-pleaded complaint rule is simply an application of the artful
pleading exception. 144 The issue is whether the plaintiff, though re-
quired to seek a remedy under federal law, has artfully pleaded his
complaint to avoid federal jurisdiction by improperly casting his
claim for relief under state law. 145 If the plaintiff has adequately
pleaded a valid state law remedy, then preemption will not support
jurisdiction; if, however, the plaintiff pleads a state cause of action
that has in reality been superseded by a federal cause of action, then
removal will be allowed.
The, Court has articulated a workable and sensible distinction
between a defense of federal preemption and federal preemption of
state causes of action. Allowing removal only in the latter case,
when, in substance, no state cause of action exists, is consistent with
the principles of federal jurisdiction and the well-pleaded complaint
rule: first, a federal defense to a state law cause of action cannot
support removal; 146 second, a plaintiff, as master of his claim, can
choose to bring a valid state law claim in state court; 147 and, third,
federal courts should narrowly construe their jurisdiction to avoid
deciding questions of state law whenever possible.148
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule and its treatment of the preemption exception to the rule
in Franchise Tax Board represent the proper approach to problems of
federal court jurisdiction. The Court's approach to jurisdiction in
these areas is consistent with the traditionally limited scope of fed-
eral jurisdiction. However, the Court's treatment of determinations
of federal jurisdiction in actions for declaratory judgment brought
in state courts is misguided. First, by rejecting a face of the declara-
tory complaint test and reaffirming the rule of Skelly Oil that a court
must base its jurisdiction on the underlying coercive action, the
Court missed an opportunity to lay down a simpler and more effi-
cient rule. In addition, by creating an exception to the rule of Skelly
144 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
145 This artful pleading test resembles the one articulated by the Ninth Circuit in
Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1981)
(footnote omitted):
Removal may be appropriate when federal law not only displaces state
law but also confers a federal remedy on the plaintiffs or compels them to
rely, explicitly or implicitly, on federal propositions. But when the claim
presents a prima facie basis for relief entirely under state law, the pre-
emption defense does not support federal jurisdiction.
146 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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Oil, holding that an action brought by a state in state court to test
the validity of its own laws is not removable even in the presence of
a substantial federal question, the Court undermined the rule of
Skelly Oil and also violated the limited procedural purpose of declar-
atory judgments. Furthermore, in its effort to restrict federal court
jurisdiction, the Court has added confusion and uncertainty to an
already confused area of jurisdictional analysis.
Jeffery L. Norton
